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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between immigration and crime in a setting where large 
migration flows offer an opportunity to carefully appraise whether the populist view that 
immigrants cause crime is borne out by rigorous evidence. We consider possible crime 
effects from two large waves of immigration that recently occurred in the UK. The first of 
these was the late 1990s/early 2000s wave of asylum seekers, and the second the large inflow 
of workers from EU accession countries that took place from 2004. A simple economics of 
crime model, when dovetailed with facts about the relative labour market position of these 
migrant groups, suggests net returns to criminal activity are likely to be very different for the 
two waves. In fact, we show that the first wave led to a small rise in property crime, whilst 
the second wave had no such impact. There was no observable effect on violent crime for 
either wave. Nor were immigrant arrest rates different to natives. Evidence from 
victimization data also suggests that the changes in crime rates during the immigrant waves 
cannot be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. Overall, our findings suggest that focusing 
on the limited labour market opportunities of asylum seekers could have beneficial effects on 
crime rates. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Many media and social commentators posit there to be a direct connection between 
immigration and crime. However, this is a key economic question on which we currently 
know very little and on which there is only a very sparse academic literature (for exceptions, 
see the US papers by Butcher and Piehl, 1998, 2005).1 This contrasts starkly with the by now 
very large literature on the labour market effects of immigration (see, inter alia,  Borjas, 
1999, or Card, 2005). 
In this paper, we study possible crime effects from two recent large flows of 
immigrants that entered the UK economy. These large flows offer an opportunity to carefully 
appraise whether the populist view that immigrants cause crime is borne out by rigorous 
evidence. We are able to exploit the fact that the two different flows were very different in 
nature, in particular in their incentive to engage in criminal activities. 
The first immigrant flow we consider is the late 1990s/early 2000s wave of asylum 
seekers (what we refer to as the “asylum wave”). The second is the large inflow of workers 
from EU accession countries (the “A8 wave”) that occurred from 2004 onwards. As we will 
demonstrate, connections of these two flows to the labour market are very different. Because 
labour market opportunities on offer are a key determinant of crime in the standard economic 
model of crime (a la Becker, 1968, or Ehrlich, 1973), we develop our empirical tests in this 
framework. In particular, labour market opportunities available to the asylum wave are much 
worse than for both natives and the A8 wave, making the net returns to criminal activity 
likely to be different. We therefore hypothesise that crime effects are more likely in the case 
of the former. 
Our evidence very much supports this way of analysing the crime-immigration 
relationship. For the asylum wave, we report evidence of a higher incidence of property crime 
induced by the immigration flow. The A8 wave sees no such effects. There is also no 
observable impact on violent crime for either wave. Evidence from victimization data 
suggests the changes in crime rates that occurred during the immigrant waves cannot be 
ascribed to crimes against immigrants, whilst data on incarceration corroborates the view that 
any immigrant related crime effect is associated only with the first wave. This leads us an 
overall conclusion that focusing on the limited labour market opportunities of asylum seekers 
could have a beneficial crime reduction effect. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the two migration 
waves in more detail. Section III briefly lays out the theoretical crime model, discusses its 
relevance to the two immigration waves and highlights its predictions for empirical analysis. 
Section IV presents area-level longitudinal estimates of the relationship between recorded 
crime and the immigration waves, and compares arrest rates for the immigrant groups of 
focus and natives. Section V gives evidence on immigrant-native differences in rates of 
incarceration. Section VI presents findings from the victimization analysis. Finally, Section 
VII concludes. 
 
 
II.  UK Immigration Since 1997 – A Tale of Two Waves 
 
We begin by describing the evolution of immigration in the UK over the last few decades, 
placing particular attention to the large flows since 1997. The latter period has been notable 
for the vast inflow of migrants relative to previous experience. We show that two particular 
                                                 
1 Indeed, in the UK – the context we study – there is no evidence at all.  The only quantitative evidence of which 
we are aware is contained in the unpublished MSc dissertation by Pearse (2009). 
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waves of immigration into the UK since this date have been major contributors to the overall 
rise. Interestingly, they have very different characteristics and motivations for migration. This 
makes them a natural focal point for analysis, and for testing whether immigrant flows impact 
on crime. 
The pattern of immigration to the UK over the last twenty five years is shown in 
Figure 1. This plots the annual change in net migration over the period 1983-2008. Over the 
entire period, England and Wales experienced a population increase of 2.2 million because of 
net migration. This contrasts with a natural increase of 2.6 million, giving a total population 
rise of 4.8 million. The figure shows a sharp rise in immigration flows since 1997. Table 1 
breaks down the overall increase in population into 5 year windows. The shift in pattern over 
time can be clearly seen. Fully three-quarters of the rise in the stock of immigrants occurred 
since 1997 and this is the only period during which the change in migration overwhelmed the 
natural change in the population. We think this gives us a credible setting for empirically 
studying the crime-immigration relationship. To see how, we now turn to a closer 
examination of the immigration flows since 1997. 
The first flow we concentrate on is the large rise in the number of asylum seekers. 
Asylum flows to industrialised countries rose in the 1990s and 2000s, with peaks in 1992 and 
2001 (see Hatton, 2009). The first peak was associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
civil war in the former Yugoslavia, and Germany was the principal destination country. The 
second peak, which we focus on in this paper (as flows to the UK were much larger), was 
associated with wars and country breakdowns such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.  
While the increased flow of asylum seekers occurred in many industrialized countries, 
the numbers seeking asylum in the UK were very large relative both to previous application 
trends and to other forms of immigration. The UK was the second-highest recipient in the 
world of asylum seekers over this period, for example receiving almost twice as many as the 
United States. Figure 2 plots the number of applications for asylum in each year from 1993 to 
2008. The sharp increase after 1997 is clear, as is the subsequent deceleration after 2002. The 
average number of new applications for asylum in the five years prior to 1997 was 31,000. In 
the five years after 1997, this rose to 71,000. At their peak, asylum seekers accounted for 
over 20% of all non-British migrants entering the UK.2  
Most of the migrants associated with the first flow are ultimately denied leave to 
remain in the UK. On average during this period, around 70% of asylum seekers had their 
claim rejected or withdrawn. In this paper, we focus on the stock of asylum seekers rather 
than the subsequent smaller stock of successful asylum applicants. We do so for three 
reasons. First, as most asylum applicants are eventually denied it would make little sense to 
focus only on the subset of successful applicants. Second, as a practical matter we have data 
on the geographical location of asylum seekers only while their claim is being assessed or 
appealed. Third, the identification strategy we use relies on the dispersal policy adopted for 
asylum seekers. Successful applicants are no longer subject to these restrictions. It is a subject 
for future research to examine the performance of successful asylum seekers in the labour 
market and their impact on crime.3 
                                                 
2 A detailed discussion of the causes of the rise and fall of asylum flows is provided by Hatton (2009). 
3 Edin, Fredriksson and Aslund (2003) examine the economic success of refugee immigrants in Sweden, where 
a dispersal policy similar to that used in the UK was operated. Their data does not identify refugee immigrants 
separately from other immigrants so their identification relies on country of origin and year of arrival. Such an 
empirical strategy for the UK would be ineffective. Suppose we take all identified countries of origin that 
contributed asylum seekers between 1997 and 2003. Over the period 412,000 asylum applications were made 
from these countries (95% of the total). We know that the ultimate acceptance rate was around 30%, implying 
around 125,000 applicants would be allowed to remain permanently in the UK. If we assume that all these 
successful applicants remained in the UK, we can compare this figure to the size of the immigrant population in 
2008 for these countries of origin who arrived as adults between 1997 and 2003. The Annual Population Survey 
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The second flow we consider is rather different. This big inflow occurred because of 
the opening up of the UK labour market to citizens of eight countries that joined the 
European Union in 2004. These accession countries (the so-called A8) were Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. At the time of 
accession, current EU members were allowed to decide whether to allow immediate access to 
their labour markets or to maintain barriers to the free movement of labour. The UK, along 
with Ireland and Sweden, chose to open up the labour market. The impact on the labour 
market has been comprehensively analysed by Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009). Our focus 
is simply on the size of the subsequent immigrant flow. Figure 2 shows the number of 
registrations on the Worker Registration Scheme for each year since 2004. Clearly, the flows 
associated with this immigrant wave dominate the inflows of non-British migrants over the 
period, accounting for almost 50% of such inflows at their peak. 
The characteristics of the two immigrant waves are very different (a feature we return 
to in Section III when considering theoretical underpinnings of our later empirical analysis). 
Tables 2A and 2B reports some summary statistics for the two waves for all other immigrants 
and for natives. Few datasets in the UK explicitly identify asylum seekers. For Table 2A we 
use the 2004 New Deal for Communities Evaluation Survey, which asks all respondents 
whether they entered the UK as refugees. The sample for this survey covers disadvantaged 
areas around the UK so the data tends to show higher unemployment rates and lower wages 
than would be true for the whole country, but we are comparing asylum seekers with natives 
and non-asylum immigrants within the same areas. The data for the A8 wave comes from the 
Labour Force Survey. 
A number of observations can be made regarding the characteristics of the two waves. 
First, immigrants in both waves were younger and more likely to be male than natives. 
Second, individuals in the A8 wave were much more likely to be single and have no 
dependent children compared to natives, other immigrants and the asylum wave. This is 
consistent with the general impression that the A8 wave was dominated by young people 
coming to take up employment rather than for family relocation. Further support for this is 
shown by the participation rates for this wave, which are higher than for natives. In contrast, 
the asylum wave has low participation rates and unemployment rates that are twice as high as 
for natives.4 It is clear that the first wave has experienced very poor employment outcomes, 
while the second wave has the opposite experience. Wages tend to be low for both waves, 
though some of the wage disadvantage for the A8 wave can be explained by the lower 
average age of this group.5 
Two broad conclusions arise from the discussion in this section. First, the rate of 
immigration into the UK was relatively smooth in the decades prior to 1997. Since then, the 
flows have been much more rapid. They have been dominated first by the flow of asylum 
seekers, then by the flow of A8 workers. Second, the characteristics and outcomes, 
particularly in the labour market, of these two waves are starkly different. These differences 
will be crucial in examining whether there are links between immigration and crime. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
gives an estimate of 634,000. So using country of origin and year of arrival to try and identify asylum 
immigrants would falsely identify in around 80% of cases. Even if we restrict the sample to only the largest 5 
countries of origin, the error rate would still be around 50%. This simply highlights the fact that the vast of 
majority of foreign migrants to the UK do not arrive as asylum seekers, even from countries that generate many 
asylum applicants. 
4 Poor labour market performance relative to natives is a feature of asylum seekers who were relocated to other 
countries.  For example, Edin at al’s (2003) analysis of refugee immigrants in Sweden shows them to have 
significantly lower employment rates as compared to Swedish born individuals. 
5 Half of the wage difference between A8 migrants and natives is explained by age, education and sex in a 
standard wage regression. The low levels of wages for A8 migrants observed in the LFS are consistent with the 
self-reported wage rates in WRS registrations. In 2008, 93% reported earning an hourly wage below £8.  
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next section discusses some theoretical considerations and highlights the importance of the 
different labour market prospects that the two waves faced, with particular reference to their 
propensity to commit crime. 
 
 
III.  Some Theoretical Considerations 
 
The ‘orthodox’ economic model of crime participation was first introduced by Becker (1968) 
and further developed by Ehrlich (1973) and others (see Freeman’s, 1999, review). 
Individuals rationally choose between crime and legal labour market work depending on the 
potential returns each offers. The ‘returns’ from crime are calculated relative to the 
probability of getting caught and the expected sanction if caught and compared to labour 
market earnings from employment.  If the former outweighs the latter then an individual will 
engage in crime. 
Formally, individuals choose between criminal and legal activity by comparing the 
expected utility from each. If U(W) is the utility from working at a legal wage W, U(WC) the 
utility from a successful (i.e. not caught) crime where p is the probability of being caught and 
S the monetary-equivalent sanction if caught6 then an individual decides to engage in 
criminal activity if 
 
(1-p)U(Wc) – pU(S) > U(W) 1) 
 
How useful is this framework for operationalising empirical models of crime for the 
two migration waves we study?  For our purposes, its key prediction is that relative labour 
market opportunities matter (there is good evidence supporting this – see, inter alia, Gould et 
al, 2002, and Machin and Meghir, 2004). People without a job (where W = 0) are more likely 
to participate in crime.  So are those where the formal wage W is low relative to WC. 
It is evident from the discussion in Section II (about Tables 2a and 2b) that these 
crime predicting features (low employment rates, high unemployment rates, and low wages) 
are more marked for the asylum wave.  Thus, it follows that, to the extent that the model is 
relevant, this is the group most likely to be connected to higher crime.  
Differences between the legal labour market opportunities of asylum seekers and both 
natives and the A8 wave are, in reality, actually even more extreme than suggested by Table 
2. Asylum seekers are forbidden from working during the first six (later extended to twelve) 
months of their claim being initiated. After this point, they can apply for permission to work 
until their case is decided. Evidence from the Refugee Council (2005) suggests that only 
about 10% of asylum seekers had been waiting less than six months for their asylum decision, 
whilst a third had been waiting over two years. Hence, the stock of asylum seekers is made 
up of a combination of those with no permission to work and claiming assistance from the 
state and those who are entitled to work because of the delays in reaching a final decision on 
their asylum claim. In addition, the level of benefits that are paid to asylum seekers is very 
low relative to other welfare benefits. For example, the weekly subsistence payment made to 
                                                 
6 One might wonder about the severity of sanctions on migrants. In general, migrants receive the same penalties 
as natives. However after a sentence has been served, migrants are liable to deportation from the UK. Section 32 
of the 2007 UK Borders Act requires the Secretary of State to issue a deportation order against any foreign 
national convicted of a criminal offence and imprisoned for at least 12 months. However Section 33 makes clear 
that such an order cannot be given if doing so would violate UK obligations under the UN Refugee Convention 
or the European Convention on Human Rights. In other words, if an asylum seeker was eventually determined 
to be a legitimate claimant they would also be protected from deportation if they were sent to prison. 
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single adult asylum seekers in 2009 was £35.52 compared to £65.45 for those receiving 
unemployment benefit. 
What about different sorts of crimes?  People usually associate the Becker-Ehrlich 
model with property crimes and so the prediction of increased crime for the asylum wave due 
to less favourable labour market opportunities is likely to be more strongly connected to this 
kind of crime. Intuitively, violent crime seems less sensible to consider in this way, especially 
in the context of immigration waves. Whilst a small literature (e.g. Grogger, 2000) does 
extend the Becker-Ehrlich model to violent crime (for Grogger through violence being 
complementary to drug crimes in the US), this seems less appropriate to the context we study 
where economic differences are likely to be central to the crime-work decision. 
The economic model of crime is also silent about whether particular groups are more 
or less likely to be victims of crime. Nevertheless, we estimate empirical models of crime 
victimization below. One relevant observation for our analysis is that migrant groups 
(especially for the A8 wave) do tend to live in migrant communities and so this reduces the 
likelihood of being victimized by natives. We test this hypothesis in the empirical work that 
follows. 
 
 
IV.  Longitudinal Models of Crime and Immigration 
 
In this section, we first estimate panel data models of the relationship between the two 
immigrant waves and recorded crime. The data we have are measured at the Local Authority 
(LA) level across England and Wales. We have 371 LA’s which can be consistently 
identified over the period 1997-2008. Our primary source of data on crime comes from 
notified offences recorded by the 43 police forces across the country. Since 1999, this data 
can be disaggregated to the LA level. Notified offences are split into two categories: Violent 
offences and Property offences (the sum of Burglary, Robbery, Theft of a Motor Vehicle and 
Theft from a Motor Vehicle). To convert these into crime rates we divide by the resident 
population aged over 15 years old. 
Our data on asylum seekers comes from the Home Office publication Asylum 
Statistics. Data at the level of local authority is available because of the administrative rules 
by which asylum seekers are housed and subsidised while their application is being 
considered. As already noted, asylum seekers are forbidden from seeking employment in the 
UK and must either rely on their own resources or request assistance from the government. 
Following the passage of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, this assistance has been 
administered by the National Asylum Support Service (NASS). The assistance takes two 
forms. For those who have accommodation (presumably with friends/family), NASS provides 
subsistence payments for food etc. For those without accommodation, NASS provides 
housing. NASS operated a dispersal policy that sought to locate asylum seekers across the 
country in a large number of locations and explicitly excluded London. The asylum seeker 
had no choice as to the destination to which he/she is sent and would often have no ties of 
any type to the area sent.7 We have no data on the location of asylum seekers who do not 
receive any support from NASS. However, on average around 80 percent of asylum seekers 
do request assistance. The data is available from 2001. 
                                                 
7 The 1999 Act required that in providing accommodation to asylum seekers the Secretary of State must have 
regard to the “desirability, in general, of providing accommodation in areas in which there is a ready supply of 
accommodation”. Furthermore, the Act explicitly states that regard may not be given to “any preference that the 
supported person or his dependents (if any) may have as to the locality in which the accommodation is to be 
provided” (s97). 
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The flow of immigrants associated with the A8 accession is measured using 
administrative data from the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). While A8 workers were 
allowed access to the UK labour market from May 2004, such workers were required to 
register on the WRS. Thus, A8 migrants registered on the WRS when they first arrived in the 
UK and had a job. The WRS only measures the inflow of workers and so is not the stock of 
A8 workers at any point in time. However, we cumulate the data over time to approximate 
the stock.8 The data is available at the LA level from May 2004 on an annual basis. Note that 
prior to 2004 A8 citizens were a small fraction of immigrants in the UK. The 2001 census 
shows they accounted for only 6% of all resident immigrants. 
Our basic estimating equation relates spatial changes in crime rates to changes in 
migration as follows: 
 
Δ(Crime/Pop)it = β1Δ(Migrants/Pop)it + β2Δln(Pop)it + β3ΔXit + Tt + εit 2) 
 
where Δ denotes an annual change, Crime is the number of notified offences, Pop is the 
resident adult population, Migrants is either the number of asylum seekers or the registrations 
on the WRS, X denotes control variables such as the percentage of the population claiming 
welfare benefits and the share of young adults in the population and T contains a set of time 
dummies.  
Table 3 reports the first set of results of estimating equation (2) for the asylum seeker 
wave, whilst Table 4 reports the results for the A8 wave.9 Note that the sample period is 
different. We have data for 2002-2008 for the asylum seekers and 2004-2008 for the A8 
migrants. Table 3 shows a positive relationship between asylum seekers and total crime, 
though the estimated coefficient on the asylum seekers variable is not significant.  
However, the picture alters when we discriminate between violent and property crime.  
For violent crime, we find a negative and borderline significant impact for asylum seekers 
whilst we find a significant positive relationship for property crime. The addition of controls 
does not substantively alter the results. We consistently find that violent crime is higher when 
the share of young people in the adult population is rising and that property crime is higher in 
areas with an increasing share of welfare benefit recipients. These effects are very much in 
line with the theoretical discussion. Interestingly, the coefficient on the asylum seeker 
variable is insignificantly different from that on the benefit claimant variable.10 Given that the 
majority of asylum seekers are also in receipt of benefits (but not included in the benefit 
claimant data), this suggests that the two groups may have broadly similar effects on crime. 
Such a result may not be too surprising given the theoretical discussion emphasising the 
importance of economic incentives for crime determination. 
As the estimates given in Table 4 show, the A8 results are very different. In this case, 
there is a significant negative relationship between immigrants and total crime, driven by 
property crime. The stark difference in property crime results between the two waves is 
consistent with our theoretical priors. Asylum seekers were more likely to engage in 
                                                 
8 We have replicated all our empirical results using the annual flow variable instead of the cumulated measure. 
Our results are robust to this alternative measure. In addition we have compared the stocks from the WRS data 
with stock estimates from the Annual Population Survey. To achieve reasonable sample sizes of A8 citizens we 
estimate APS stocks at the level of Police Force Area and aggregate the WRS data to the same level. For 2008, 
the correlation across PFAs between the two stock measures is 0.75. There is no evidence to suggest that there 
are significantly different outflow rates across the different areas, with the correlation of changes being 0.73. 
9 We have also estimated the model in log differences and clustering standard errors at both the police force area 
level and local authority level. Our results are robust to these alternatives. 
10  The p-value of the test statistic is 0.433. 
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economic crime, as their outside options were very limited whereas the A8 migrants came 
with the explicit intention of gaining employment and had unrestricted access to the UK 
labour market. The impact on violent crime is broadly zero and, at the margin, the asylum 
wave appears somewhat less associated with violence than the A8 wave. 
We have carried out a range of robustness tests, pushing the basic analysis further in 
several directions. These are shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7. Our first check for robustness 
focuses on the asylum wave. First, we include fixed-effects at the level of the Police Force 
(PF) Area. On average, there are 9 local authorities for each PF area. As the models are 
estimated in first-differences, the inclusion of PF area dummies controls for trends in crime 
rates at this level of aggregation. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 5 show these results for violent 
and property crime respectively. The effect on property crime almost halves and becomes 
borderline insignificant.  
The next issue relates to the fact that, so far, we have treated the migrant location 
variable as exogenous. If, however, settlement location is a choice variable we might expect 
such choice to bias our estimates. For example, if immigrants choose to locate in areas of low 
crime, this would bias down estimates of the causal effect of immigrants on crime. Such an 
effect might work directly (i.e. immigrants find out where low crime areas are) or indirectly 
(i.e. immigrants move to areas with good employment prospects that also produce lower 
crime rates). Fortunately, for the asylum wave we can correct for this location endogeneity. 
As discussed above, those asylum seekers requiring accommodation are allocated to a 
location by the NASS. However, NASS chose the location based on the availability of 
unpopular or vacant housing stocks. Unsurprisingly therefore the sample of local authorities 
that received asylum seekers under the dispersal policy were more deprived than average. We 
have 82 local authorities that had some asylum seekers provided with accommodation by 
NASS at some point since 2001 and 289 with no dispersal allocations.11  
Table 6 provides some summary statistics on the differences between the two sets. For 
our purposes, the level of crime in a local authority is not relevant since we estimate fixed-
effects models. Therefore, the simple fact that asylum seekers were disproportionately sent to 
deprived areas with higher crime rates does not mechanically produce a positive relationship 
between changes in asylum stocks and changes in crime rates. Of more concern would be if 
we found that the growth rate in crime before the dispersal policy began was different 
between those areas that were designated by NASS and those that were not. As the final rows 
of Table 6 show there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case. 
We can therefore directly exploit this exogenous variation in location by re-estimating 
the asylum regressions and instrumenting the total number of asylum seekers in each local 
area by the number in dispersal accommodation in each local area. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 
5 report the IV results.12 The violent crime effect remains insignificant, though the coefficient 
switches from negative to close to zero. The impact on the property crime regression is 
stronger. The coefficient on the asylum seekers variable more than doubles and is strongly 
significant. This suggests that endogenous location choice is an important issue for this wave 
                                                 
11 In these calculations we include all London authorities as having no asylum seekers allocated via the dispersal 
policy. In practice some asylum seekers were located in London either because they did not need 
accommodation support, because their accommodation was grandfathered in when NASS was created or 
because of an exceptional decision to allow NASS accommodation to be provided in the capital. Our 
conclusions are robust if we instead include London local authorities with positive numbers of accommodated 
asylum seekers in the dispersal group. However to do so would bias our estimates of the relative characteristics 
of those locations explicitly chosen by NASS as part of its dispersal policy. 
12 Appendix Table 2 reports the IV first-stage regressions. 
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of immigrants and biases the estimated crime effect. When we also include PF area dummies 
the property effect is slightly attenuated but remains significantly positive.13 
Analysing the results of the IV regressions separately for male and female asylum 
seekers provides further confirmation that selective choice of dispersal locations by the 
authorities does not mechanically lead to our findings. If it were the case that the authorities 
had chosen by accident or design dispersal locations that were about to experience a relative 
increase in crime, we should see the coefficient of the female asylum stock also being 
positive. There is no evidence to suggest that male and female asylum seekers were 
systematically sent to different dispersal locations, and females account for around 45% of 
the total stock. We find no significant effect from the female asylum stock on crime in any 
specification. 
For the A8 wave we also include PF area dummies (columns 1 and 4 of Table 7) but 
there inclusion has little effect. For this wave we are not able to as precisely control for 
endogenous location choice as with the asylum wave as A8 migrants could choose to work 
anywhere in the UK. It is common in the immigration literature to use the locational choice 
of the stock of previous migrants from the flow country as an instrument for subsequent 
flows (see e.g. Card (2001) and Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008) with respect to wage 
effects of immigration in the US and in the UK; Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti (2008) for an 
application to crime and immigration in Italy). However as previously noted, the stock of 
such immigrants in the UK was small prior to the 2004 opening of the labour market and it is 
also not clear that the workers involved in the A8 flow would have had any strong 
attachments to previous settlers from these countries. As an alternative we follow the 
approach of Lemos and Portes (2008). They suggest an instrument based on the availability 
of flights from the A8 to the UK. The intuition is that areas close to airports with frequent and 
varied connections to the A8 countries are more likely to attract the A8 flow. We use data 
from the Civil Aviation Authority that reports the number of A8 destinations flown to from 
every UK airport on annual basis. For each local authority the instrument is calculated as the 
log of the number of A8 destinations flown to from all airports within a 50 mile radius in the 
previous year. This is a plausible exogenous instrument and a first-stage regression gives an 
F-statistic of just under 8.  
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 show the result of instrumenting the A8 migrant variable. 
As expected, the coefficients increase in absolute value, though the precision of the estimates 
falls substantially. The property crime effect is now positive but is insignificant and remains 
well below the size of the effect observed for the asylum wave. When we also control for the 
PF area trends, there is a further drop in the coefficient. While we are certainly not 
controlling for location endogeneity as precisely as we can for the asylum wave, our broad 
conclusion that higher property crime was significantly raised as a result of the asylum wave 
but not by the A8 wave remains intact. The impact on violent crime is indistinguishable from 
zero for both groups. 
We can provide a little more evidence on the A8 wave by comparing arrest rates by 
nationality. Such data is neither published nor collected in the UK, but we made applications 
to every police force in England and Wales under the 2000 Freedom of Information Act 
requesting data on the number of arrests made each year since 2004 by nationality and type of 
crime. Of the 42 police forces contacted, 27 provided at least some data.14 By 2008, we have 
data covering 67% of total crime in England and Wales.  
                                                 
13 Appendix Table 1 reports asylum IV regressions for more disaggregated crime categories. 
14 Those providing no data are police forces that do not collect nationality information at the time of arrest. 
Some forces only started systematically collecting such information in the last couple of years. We find no 
evidence that those forces which do not collect such data differ significantly from those that do. 
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In Table 8, we pool the data for all years and police forces and estimate the 
relationship between the share of A8 arrests in total arrests and the share of A8 citizens in the 
local population. A coefficient of one would be consistent with no differential effect of A8 
citizens on local arrest rates. The results are broadly consistent with this neutrality. In column 
1 we estimate a slightly larger coefficient than one but in column 3 we restrict the sample to 
data points that are consistently reported and the coefficient is insignificantly different from 
one.15 Similar results are obtained when we focus on the smaller sample that isolates property 
crimes. 
 
 
V.  Immigration and Incarceration 
 
An alternative approach is to focus on incarceration, rather than reported crime or arrests. The 
main advantage of this approach is that we have data on the nationality of prisoners so that 
we can more directly link the immigration flows from particular countries to incarceration 
rates. Unfortunately such data is only available at the national level, so we will be identifying 
the link between the asylum and A8 waves and imprisonment by comparing the evolution of 
incarceration rates for the set of countries providing the flows to the incarceration rates of 
natives and of citizens of countries not involved in the two waves we focus on. In 
consequence this analysis is susceptible to the criticism that we identify the asylum wave 
effect using nationality even though the majority of such nationals were unlikely to be asylum 
seekers. To mitigate this we focus only on the five largest asylum seeker nationalities but 
recognise that this analysis can at best only be considered supportive of the previous results. 
The A8 results are less prone to this criticism as the wave from 2004 dominates the stock of 
A8 citizens in the UK. 
Our data on incarceration comes from the Home Office/Ministry of Justice 
publication Prison Statistics. From 1993, we have annual data on the nationality of every 
person held in prison in England and Wales. In addition we have data on type of offence an 
individual is convicted for, broken down by whether the individual is British or Foreign. To 
make use of these data we need to convert the raw numbers into incarceration rates. To do 
this we need the denominator i.e. the number of adults of each nationality resident in England 
and Wales each year. This requires some work. To begin with we have data on country of 
birth for those aged over 15 from the decennial census for 1991 and 2001. We smoothly 
interpolate between the two census years to produce annual totals. The census does not ask 
about nationality. To convert the country of birth figures into nationality figures we use the 
Labour Force Survey. This survey has consistently asked both country of birth and nationality 
since 1992. We pool all Spring surveys over the period 1992-2007 and estimate the factor 
relating country of birth to nationality for each country of birth, restricted to residents aged 15 
and over. We then use this factor to adjust the census data to produce estimates of population 
for each year from 1991 to 2001. From 2004, the Office of National Statistics has produced 
estimates of population by nationality that we use directly. Finally for the years 2002 and 
2003 we interpolate between 2001 and 2004.  
We can graphically illustrate the results for our two immigrant waves of interest. We 
generate an asylum and an A8 incarceration rate by weighting each nationalities incarceration 
rate each year by the share of that nationality in the flow associated with the two immigrant 
                                                 
15 To identify the clean sample we make use of information provided from the relevant Police Force. For 
example, a number of forces report that some of the data, particularly in the first two years of our sample, was 
only collected on an ad hoc basis and that many arrest records have no nationality recorded. Such data points are 
excluded from the clean sample. 
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waves. These flow shares are average estimates for the period 1997-2002 for the asylum 
wave16 and 2004-2007 for the A8 wave. We then examine the trend in these incarceration 
rates before and after the waves occur relative to both the native incarceration rate and the 
incarceration rate of all immigrants from countries not included in the asylum or A8 wave. As 
we have data from 1993 to 2008 we are able in both cases to examine pre-wave trends to 
ensure that our results are not driven by differential trends that existed before the large flows 
occurred. Figure 3A and 3B show the trends for the two immigrant waves. It is clear that the 
incarceration rates for the Asylum wave rose rapidly as the size of the group expanded in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, both in absolute terms and relative to the incarceration rates of 
both foreigners from non-Asylum countries and British citizens. The rise began to tail off 
toward the end of the sample period. In contrast the trend in incarceration rates for the A8 
nationals almost exactly mirrored the trend for British citizens from 2004, suggesting no 
obvious impact of this wave on prison populations. 
More formally, we can estimate the following model of incarceration: 
 
IncarcerationRateit = Ii + Tt + θWaveDummyit + μit 3) 
 
In (3), the Wave Dummy variable takes the value 1 for the immigrant wave 
observations for all years from the start of the relevant immigration wave (1997 for the 
Asylum Wave and 2004 for the A8 wave) and is zero for the earlier years and for the 
comparison group. We also control for the group fixed effect and time fixed effects. A 
positive coefficient θ would indicate a relative rise in incarceration rates following the 
immigrant wave. Results are given in Table 9. Consistent with the evidence from the charts, 
we find a significant jump in the incarceration rates of the asylum wave nationalities 
after1997, with rates 0.19 percentage points higher than the non-Asylum control group. This 
is in addition to an average 0.16 percentage point higher incarceration rate. The estimated 
effect for the A8 group are insignificantly different from zero when compared to the British 
control group and are actually negative compared to the non-A8 control group. We conclude 
that there is strong evidence that the asylum wave led to a rise in incarceration rates for 
nationals of countries that were disproportionately represented in the asylum wave, relative to 
both natives and other immigrants, whereas the A8 wave had no discernible effect on the 
prison population. To the extent that there are more people in prison from A8 countries, this 
is simply a result of the massive rise in the size of those populations in the UK rather than 
evidence of increased incarceration rates.17 
Finally, we look at the data on the type of crime for which the individual has been 
incarcerated. In this analysis we cannot distinguish across nationalities. However we can see 
whether the data support our previous results that suggest that neither wave had any 
observable effect on violent crime whilst property crime had increased as a result of the 
asylum wave but not as a result of the A8 wave. Note that the exact definition of offence 
types is different from those considered in Section 2 as the data is from the Prison Service 
rather than the Police. We therefore focus on two broad groups of offences: (a) violent 
                                                 
16 For the asylum wave we focus only on the largest 5 countries in terms of flow. For the period 1997-2002, 
these are in order of contribution Serbia & Montenegro, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. They 
represent 40% of applications over the period. 
17 The number of prisoners from A8 countries rose from 145 in 2003 to 906 in 2008. This still represents only 
about 1% of the prison population. It should also be noted that the A8 prison population in years prior to the A8 
wave were very small which explains the volatility in incarceration rates for this group in the early years of the 
sample as shown in Figure 3B. 
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offences and (b) non-violent economic offences – burglary, robbery, theft and handling, fraud 
and forgery and drugs.  
Figures 4A and 4B show the trends for British and Foreign prisoners. For violent 
crime, the increase over time in offending is much stronger among the British than the 
Foreigners. Indeed there is essentially no change in the violent incarceration rate of foreigners 
over the whole period in spite of the two large immigrant waves that occurred. By the end of 
the sample there is no obvious difference between the two groups in terms of violence 
incarceration rates. By contrast the rise in non-violent incarceration was faster among the 
Foreign nationals relative to British up to 2003/4 but has then reversed substantially, though 
the gap remains larger than in the early 1990s. These results are all consistent with the 
regression results of Section IV. 
 
 
VI.  Crime Victimization 
 
As discussed in Section III, we are also able to consider whether there is any evidence of 
higher crime victimization for the two immigrant waves. We use data from both the British 
Crime Surveys from 2004 to 2008 and the New Deal for Communities Surveys from 2002 
and 2004. The former is used for official victimization statistics and is a large representative 
sample of the UK population. The identification of the immigrant waves is by country-of-
birth and year of arrival in the UK. This is unproblematic for the A8 wave but the 
measurement of the asylum wave has the problems of mis-identification discussed in Section 
II. To address this issue, the second data set is used which can explicitly identify asylum 
applicants from other non-British immigrants. Fortunately, the data contain similar questions 
on victimization as those used in the British Crime Survey.  
Table 10 shows the percent of individuals reporting that they have been a victim of 
crime in the twelve months up to the survey date.18 Victimization rates are reported for UK 
born natives, the asylum wave, the five largest asylum countries, the A8 wave and other non-
UK born individuals.  Reassuringly, the data from both sources provide a similar picture, 
with both asylum and A8 waves having lower crime victimization rates than natives. 
Table 11 shows statistical models that condition on additional survey variables.  For 
the British Crime Survey, the key finding of the previous Table remains intact, namely that 
crime victimization is significantly lower for the two migrant waves we consider. For the 
New Deal Survey, we find that lower victimization rates for asylum seekers in the raw data 
are eliminated when controls are added such that rates appear to be essentially the same as 
those for natives.19  
In summary, the results seem to suggest that differential changes in crime rates during 
the immigrant waves cannot be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. There is little 
empirical work on the factors affecting rates of crime and victimization against immigrants. 
For example, Krueger and Pischke (1997) find little evidence that crimes against immigrants 
in Germany can be explained either by economic variables or by the relative number of 
immigrants within a locality. They do however find substantial differences between West and 
East Germany in the rate of crimes against foreigners. 
 
                                                 
18 This includes all victimizations reported by individuals and inevitably features a number of very minor 
incidents that would not appear as crimes reported to the police, hence the relatively high percentages.  The 
numbers are in line with Home Office crime rates based on the BCS victimization data (for example, in the year 
to 2009, there were 10.2 million household and personal victimizations in England and Wales). 
19 It should be noted that we have fewer control variables available in the second data set.  
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VII.  Conclusion 
 
There is much popular commentary on the supposed links between crime and immigration, 
but a notable paucity of credible empirical evidence about the relationship. This paper has 
sought to fill some of this gap with an analysis on the response of crime rates to two very 
different immigration waves that hit the UK over the last decade. Our view is that the scale of 
these waves, their timing and their very different characteristics make them very suitable for 
the empirical analysis of crime and immigration.  
The canonical Becker economic model of crime generates the key proposition that 
relative legal labour market opportunities are a fundamental driver of the decision as to 
whether to commit crime. The model is most obviously relevant for property-related crime 
since the motivation for violence is less clearly susceptible to an economic interpretation. The 
model therefore provides a useful framework in which to think about the likely crime rate 
response to the two immigrant waves we study. The asylum wave was associated with low 
labour force participation rates, high unemployment and low wage levels. Indeed, asylum 
seekers are prevented from obtaining legal employment whilst their application is being 
considered. By contrast the A8 wave was directly linked to the opening up of UK labour 
markets for citizens of these countries and unsurprisingly the participation rates of this wave 
are very high – in fact much higher even than natives. Wages tend to be lower though partly 
this is accounted for by the relative youth of the A8 wave. In addition given the large flows 
involved, the wage rate can come as no surprise to those choosing to seek work in the UK.  
Using an array of different sources and empirical methods, our broad conclusions are 
simple and consistent with the theoretical framework. For property crime, we find that crime 
rates are significantly higher in areas in which asylum seekers are located, but that no such 
relationship can be found for the A8 wave. This conclusion is robust when we attempt to 
control for the endogeneity of location choice and for crime trends within the Police Force 
Area. In contrast, for both waves we can find no significant relationship between immigrants 
and violent crime. The same picture emerges when we explore the time-series evolution of 
incarceration rates, which suggest a rise in the rate of incarceration of foreigners from asylum 
seeker countries as the asylum wave arrived in the UK, but no such rise for A8 foreigners as 
that wave arrived. The prison data also show that it is non-violent crimes that were driving 
these incarceration rates rather than violent crimes. Finally, we show that the results are hard 
to explain on the basis that the rise in crime may be a result of crime against immigrants. 
Interestingly we find that victimization rates are in fact, if anything, lower against the two 
waves than for natives in general.  
It is natural to ask about the size of the property crime effect we find for the asylum 
wave. To give a sense of the magnitude on crime rates, consider the estimated coefficient 
from Column 6 of Table 5. This gives a value of 0.70 on the migrant/population variable in 
the property crime regression. Given the definitions of the variables this implies that raising 
the percentage share of the local population who are asylum seekers by x% increases the 
property crime rate by 0.70x%. The size of the asylum population in the average local 
authority was of course very low over our sample period. Across all England and Wales it 
averaged 0.1% of the local adult population, so the average property crime rate might be 
0.07% higher as a result – only around 2% of the average property crime rate of around 2.7%. 
Of course, some authorities had appreciably more asylum seekers located in the area, though 
shares larger than 1% of the local population were extremely rare. This suggests that more 
attention should perhaps have been focused on the potential localized crime risks involved in 
the concentrated dispersal policy adopted by the authorities but that national crime rates were 
unlikely to have been strongly influenced by the arrival of the asylum wave. 
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Our results also suggest that focusing on improving the limited labour market 
opportunities of asylum seekers has scope to generate crime reductions, in addition to 
generating potential cost savings in terms of benefits. Since we are (rightly) obliged to 
consider all applications for asylum, it makes sense to allow applicants to seek work whilst 
their applications are being considered particularly given the long duration that final 
decisions on such applications can take. In addition job-training and language courses are 
likely to be particularly beneficial for such migrants. Such an approach can potentially 
significantly tilt the relative labour market opportunities of migrants relative to illegal 
activities. The disadvantage of such an approach is the risk that it signals to potential 
migrants that asylum application could be used as a method of seeking work in the UK rather 
than as a route for those fleeing persecution. 
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FIGURE 1: ANNUAL NET CHANGE IN MIGRATION, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1983-2008 
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FIGURE 2: ASYLUM APPLICATIONS AND WRS REGISTRATIONS, 1993-2008 
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FIGURE 3A: INCARCERATION RATES FOR ASYLUM WAVE, 1993-2008 
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FIGURE 3B: INCARCERATION RATES FOR A8 WAVE, 1993-2008 
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FIGURE 4A: INCARCERATION RATES FOR VIOLENT OFFENCES, 1993-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4B: INCARCERATION RATES FOR NON-VIOLENT ECONOMIC OFFENCES, 1993-2008 
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TABLE 1: COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1983-2008 
 
 
 Population at  Change over Natural Net 
 Beginning Period Change Migration 
  of Period 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1983-1987 49,581,600 541,400 308,000 233,400 
1988-1992 50,123,000 752,600 627,000 125,600 
1993-1997 50,875,600 684,000 478,000 206,000 
1998-2002 51,559,600 1,012,500 358,000 654,500 
2003-2008 52,572,100 1,867,600 829,000 1,038,600 
 
1983-2008 49,581,600 4,858,100 2,600,000 2,258,100   
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: Data from Population Trends, England and Wales, all ages. 
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TABLE 2A: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ASYLUM WAVE 
 
 
 British                          Non-British                         Non-British  
                           Non-Asylum                           Asylum  
   
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
% Male 49.6 53.9 60.4 
Age 40.9 37.7 35.2  
% with Children 40.4 43.5 52.7 
% Single Person 21.9 15.9 18.4   
% No Qual 38.4 32.2 51.7 
% Degree 3.6 6.5 4.1 
% Poor English - 9.8 32.3 
Participation Rate 60.4 62.3 48.6 
Unemployment Rate 14.7 17.7 32.7 
Annual Mean Wage 16267 15543 12672 
Annual Median Wage 14300 13000 10400 
Sample Size 8063 3385 514 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: Data are tabulated from the 2004 Household Survey Data of the National Evaluation of the New Deal for 
Communities Programme. British are all those who identify themselves as British and Asylum are those who 
entered the UK as refugees. Sample are all Heads of Household aged 18-65 and all results are weighted to 
reflect the population in the selected areas. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2B: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR A8 WAVE 
 
 
 British                          Non-British                         Non-British  
                           Non-A8 Wave                           A8 Wave  
   
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
% Male 49.6 49.3 54.6 
Age 41.3 38.0 28.7  
% White 93.1 65.0 93.7 
% Married 52.3 53.2 35.7  
% No Children 59.7 59.3 70.5  
% Degree 15.3 16.1 7.2 
Years of School 12.5 13.8 14.8 
Participation Rate 77.6 71.9 89.0 
Unemployment Rate 4.9 7.1 6.3 
Mean Weekly Wage 423 432 268 
Median Weekly Wage 350 242 346 
Sample Size 398113 42551 2045 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: Data are tabulated from the Labour Force Survey, Spring Quarters 2004-2009. British are all British 
citizens, A8 wave are all observations where country of birth is one of the A8 countries and year of arrival in the 
UK was 2004 or later, and non-A8 wave are all other non-British. Sample are all aged 18-65 and results are 
weighted using population weights. 
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TABLE 3: PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR ASYLUM WAVE CRIME RATES 
 
 
     (1)                     (2)                      (3)                    (4)                     (5)                    (6) 
 
 All Crime           All Crime          Violent            Violent             Property           Property 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Δ(Asylum/Pop) 0.231 0.169 -0.141 -0.196* 0.373* 0.365*  
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.092) (0.092) (0.119) (0.119) 
 
Δln(Pop)  -0.015  -0.008  -0.007 
  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
 
Δ(Benefit Rate)  0.290*  0.012  0.278* 
  (0.045)  (0.027)  (0.035) 
 
Δ(Young Share)  0.120*  0.146*  -0.026 
  (0.042)  (0.025)  (0.032) 
 
Time Dummies     x      x     x     x         x       x  
 
Sample Size     2597     2597     2597      2597        2597       2597 
 
R2     0.213    0.226     0.338      0.346       0.169       0.190 
 
 
Notes: Regressions are run over the period 2002-2008. The dependent variable is Δ(Number of Crimes 
Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions are weighted by adult population. Standard errors in parentheses 
and * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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TABLE 4: PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR A8 WAVE CRIME RATES 
 
 
   (1)                   (2)                      (3)                    (4)                     (5)                    (6) 
 
                                              All Crime       All Crime            Violent             Violent            Property            Property 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Δ(Cum A8/Pop) -0.064* -0.085* -0.022 -0.010 -0.042 -0.076*  
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
Δln(Pop)  -0.025  -0.020  -0.005 
  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
 
Δ(Benefit Rate)  0.365*  0.027  0.338* 
  (0.049)  (0.029)  (0.037) 
 
Δ(Young Share)  0.004  0.088*  -0.084* 
  (0.052)  (0.031)  (0.039) 
 
Time Dummies     x      x     x     x         x       x  
 
Sample Size     1850     1850     1850      1850        1850       1850 
 
R2     0.097    0.125     0.185      0.188       0.219       0.256 
 
 
Notes: Regressions are run over the period 2004-2008. The dependent variable is Δ(Number of Crimes 
Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions are weighted by adult population. Standard errors in parentheses 
and * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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TABLE 5: PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR ASYLUM WAVE CRIME RATES – ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
 
           (1)                    (2)                     (3)                    (4)                     (5)                    (6) 
 
                                                Violent            Violent             Violent            Property            Property            Property 
                                                              
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Δ(Asylum/Pop) -0.222* 0.014 -0.026 0.201 0.947* 0.696*  
 (0.092) (0.130) (0.127) (0.116) (0.168) (0.160) 
 
Δln(Pop) -0.032* -0.009 -0.034* -0.016 -0.012 -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
 
Δ(BenefitRate) -0.055 0.009 -0.058 0.256* 0.270* 0.249* 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.032) (0.040) (0.035) (0.040) 
 
Δ(YoungShare) 0.154* 0.140* 0.151* 0.007 -0.042 -0.001 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
 
Time Dummies     x      x     x     x         x       x 
 
Police Force Area      x       x      x         x 
 
IV        x      x           x       x 
 
Sample Size     2597     2597     2597      2597        2597       2597 
 
R2     0.366    0.347     0.377      0.253       0.186       0.262 
 
 
Notes: Regressions are run over the period 2002-2008. The dependent variable is Δ(Number of Crimes 
Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions are weighted by adult population. Standard errors in parentheses 
and * indicates significance at the 5% level. The instrumental variable is the number of asylum seekers in 
dispersal accommodation. 
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TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DISPERSAL AND NON-DISPERSAL AREAS, 2001 
 
 
 All Areas Dispersal Non-Dispersal t-test of 
  Areas Areas means 
   
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unemployment Rate 2.5 3.3 2.0 8.6 
Benefit Claimant Rate 11.0 13.6 9.5 8.1 
Youth Share 15.0 16.8 14.1 8.9 
 
Total Crime Rate 5.2 6.8 4.3 9.2 
Violent Crime Rate 1.5 1.7 1.4 4.2 
Property Crime Rate 3.6 5.1 2.9 10.6 
 
Prior Δ Total Crime Rate -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.1 
Prior Δ Violent Crime Rate 0.13 0.19 0.09 1.1 
Prior Δ Property Crime Rate -0.14 -0.21 -0.11 1.4 
 
Count   371  82  289  
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: The change in crime rates is the two-year change between 1999 and 2001. All figures are weighted by 
adult population in the local authority.  
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TABLE 7: PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR A8 WAVE CRIME RATES – ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
 
   (1)                   (2)                      (3)                    (4)                     (5)                    (6) 
 
                                               Violent            Violent            Violent               Property           Property            Property 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Δ(Cum A8/Pop) 0.006 0.342 -0.073 -0.081* 0.290 0.142 
 (0.021) (0.343) (0.661) (0.026) (0.421) (0.820) 
 
Δln(Pop) -0.039* -0.056 -0.030 -0.015 -0.051 -0.044 
 (0.012) (0.040) (0.074) (0.015) (0.049) (0.092) 
 
Δ(Benefit Rate) -0.039 -0.036 -0.027 0.316* 0.278* 0.270 
 (0.034) (0.073) (0.128)  (0.042) (0.090) (0.159) 
 
Δ(YoungShare) 0.119* 0.210 0.111 -0.057 0.025 0.009 
 (0.033) (0.111) (0.194) (0.040) (0.136) (0.240) 
 
Time Dummies     x      x     x     x         x       x 
 
Police Force Area     x             x      x        x  
 
IV        x    x           x       x  
 
Sample Size     1850     1703     1703      1850        1703       1703 
 
R2     0.236    0.063       0.314       0.190       0.315 
 
 
Notes: Regressions are run over the period 2004-2008. The dependent variable is Δ(Number of Crimes 
Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions are weighted by adult population. Standard errors in parentheses 
and * indicates significance at the 5% level. The instrumental variable is the log of the number of A8 
destinations flown to from airports within a 50 mile radius in the previous year. 
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TABLE 8: ARREST RATES BY NATIONALITY, A8 WAVE 
 
 
  (1)          (2)    (3)      (4)     
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
A8 Share in  1.250 1.040 1.148 1.026 
Population (0.090) (0.151) (0.089) (0.156) 
 
 
All Crimes           x  x 
Property Crimes  x  x 
Clean Sample   x x 
 
Sample Size 90 57 71  50 
R2     0.681      0.451 0.705      0.465 
 
 
Notes: Regressions are run over the period 2004-2008.The dependent variable is the share in total arrests of A8 
citizens. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 9: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES OF INCARCERATION RATES 
 
 
                                         Asylum Wave          A8 Wave 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                           Non-Asylum                     British                            Non-A8                     British 
                                              Nationals               Nationals 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Wave Dummy 0.194 0.187 -0.078 -0.018   
 (0.081) (0.096) (0.029) (0.040) 
 
 
Group Dummy 0.156 0.286 -0.129 0.013 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.016) (0.022) 
 
 
 
R2     0.649      0.716 0.865      0.227 
 
 
Notes: Regressions are run over the period 1993-2008. Wave Dummy equals 1 for the asylum/A8 group after 
the relevant wave begins and 0 before. Group Dummy equals 1 for the asylum/A8 group and zero for the 
comparison group. All regressions include the full set of time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 10: VICTIMIZATION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
A: British Crime Survey, 2004-2008 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                            UK            Asylum         Asylum              A8               Other                  Sample 
                    Wave            Wave              Wave Non-UK                 Size 
         Largest 5 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Crime Victim in Last Year (%) 31.6 22.4 23.7 27.1 29.7 141378 
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
B: New Deal Evaluation, 2002-2004 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                                       UK            Asylum        Non-Asylum          Sample 
                                                    Size 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Crime Victim in Last Year (%) 35.4 31.0 29.6 23725 
 
 
Notes: Panel A from pooled British Crime Survey data (2004-5 to 2007-8 waves).  The Asylum Wave 
percentages are weighted to reflect asylum shares as with earlier Tables.  The Largest 5 Asylum Wave countries 
are:  Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia and Sri Lanka. Panel B from pooled National 
Evaluation of the New Deal for Communities data (2002 and 2004 waves).  
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TABLE 11: VICTIMIZATION EQUATIONS, PR(CRIME VICTIM IN LAST YEAR) 
 
  
   British Crime Survey, 2004-2008                             New Deal Evaluation, 2002-2004 
 
       
Asylum  
 
  -0.142 
(0.044) 
  0.047 
(0.054) 
 0.032 
(0.054) 
Asylum Wave 
Largest 5 
 
-0.056  
(0.024) 
-0.073 
 (0.024) 
-0.076  
(0.024) 
   
A8 -0.074 
 (0.019) 
-0.152  
(0.019) 
-0.155 
 (0.019) 
   
       
Other -0.005  
(0.006) 
-0.020  
(0.006) 
-0.021 
(0.006) 
-0.178 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
-0.016 
(0.031) 
       
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Police Force Area No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Sample size 141378 141164 141164 23725 23725 23725 
       
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Control variables for the BCS regressions are: age, gender, student, 
education (9 categories), urban/rural (8 categories), housing tenure (8 categories), number of children (10 
categories), household income (15 categories), marital status (5 categories), years at accommodation (5 
categories), ethnicity (5 categories), nationality within UK (5 categories). Years run from 2004 to 2008 and 
there are 42 police force areas. Control variables for the New Deal regressions are: age, gender, education (6 
categories), region (9 categories), household income (9 categories), housing tenure (3 categories), years at 
accommodation (6 categories), household size (5 categories), household composition (4 categories), ethnicity (3 
categories), employment status (3 categories), English language ability.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: IV PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR ASYLUM WAVE USING MORE 
DISAGGREGATED CRIME CATEGORIES 
 
 
                                                           Violent             Robbery           Burglary      Theft of MV      Theft from MV    
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Δ(Asylum/Pop) -0.026 0.023 0.199* 0.113* 0.341*   
 (0.127) (0.030) (0.063) (0.039) (0.094)  
 
Δln(Pop) -0.034* 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.012  
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)  
 
Δ(BenefitRate) -0.058 0.072* 0.102* 0.040* 0.034  
 (0.032) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.023)  
 
Δ(YoungShare) 0.151* 0.014* -0.020 -0.011 0.015  
 (0.027) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) (0.020)  
 
 
Sample Size     2597     2597     2597      2597        2597  
 
Share in Total     0.41      0.05      0.17      0.12       0.25 
 
R2     0.377    0.167     0.231      0.235       0.188  
 
 
Notes: Regressions are run over the period 2002-2008. The dependent variable is Δ(Number of Crimes 
Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions include time and police force area dummies and are weighted by 
adult population. Standard errors in parentheses and * indicates significance at the 5% level. The instrumental 
variable is the number of asylum seekers in dispersal accommodation. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: IV FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS 
 
 
                 Asylum Regression                           A8 Regression  
    
   
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Δ(Dispersed Asylum/Pop) 1.022* 
 (0.020) 
   
ln(Airports(t-1))  0.022* 
  (0.008) 
    
Δln(Pop) 0.008* 0.111* 
 (0.001) (0.012) 
  
Δ(Benefit Rate) -0.004 0.183* 
 (0.004) (0.034) 
  
Δ(YoungShare) 0.020* -0.285* 
 (0.004) (0.037) 
 
Sample Size 2597 1703 
 
R2 0.610 0.129 
 
IV F Stat 2634 7.7 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: First-stage IV regressions run over the period 2001-2008 (for asylum regression) and 2004-2008 (for A8 
regression). Regressions also include time dummies. All regressions are weighted by adult population. Standard 
errors in parentheses and * indicates significance at the 5% level.  
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